W E are interested in the behavior of an organism because of its effects on the environment. (One effect on the social environment is, of course, the arousal of our interest.) Some effects seem to throw light on the behavior which produces them, but their explanatory role has been clouded by the fact that they follow the behavior and, therefore, raise the specter of teleology.
was later to be extended by Pavlovian conditioning, and the concept could be broadened to include the releasers of the ethologists, but only a small part of behavior caj^Jp^jDredicted--er--t:ontrolled' V simply by identifying or majiirjiulating stimuli. The La"w~6T Effect added an important new class of variables of which behavior could be shown to be a function.
Thorndike's solution was probably suggested by Darwin's treatment of phylogenetic purpose. Before Darwin, the purpose of a well developed eye might have been said to be to permit the organism to see better. The principle of natural selection moved "seeing better" from the future into the ^if past: Organisms with well developed eyes were deAscended from those which had been able to see better and had therefore produced more descendants. Thorndike was closer to the principle of natural selection than the above statement of his law. He did not need to say that a response which had been followed by a certain kind of consequence was more likely to occur again but simply that it was not less likely. It eventually held the field because responses which failed to have such effects tended, like less favored species, to disappear. Thorndike was concerned with how animals solved problems rather than with the concept of purpose, and his Law of Effect did not end purposive formulations. The devices used for the study of behavior during the next quarter of a century continued to emphasize an intentional relation between behavior and its consequences. The relation was represented spatially. In mazes, runways, and open fields, for example, organisms ran toward their goals. In discrimination apparatuses they •crrosirffie' door which led to food. They escaped from the dangerous side of shuttle boxes or pulled away from sources of dangerous stimulation. They drew objects toward them with rakes or strings. The experimenter could see the purpose of an action in the spatial relation of the organism and the objects toward which it was moving or from-which it was receding. It was even asserted that the organism itself should see a purposive relationship in some such form in order to behave effectively. Kb'hler, for example, criticized Thorndike on just this score.
The spatial representation of purpose, expectancy, or intention obscured one of the most important features of the relation emphasized by Thorndike. The process he identified remained unexplored for 30 years, and during that time was confused with rote habit formation and with various .formulations of Eavlovian-conditioning. In the late 1920s, however, the consequences of behavior began to be studied with devices of another sort. Pavlov's technique for the study of conditioned reflexes contributed to their development, even though Pavlov himself was not primarily concerned with consequences as such. In his basic studies, indeed, it might be said that the organism did not receive food for doing anything; the salivation elicited by the conditioned stimulus did not produce the food which followed. The experimental design, however, called for food to be introduced at a given moment automatically. Once the procedure was familiar, it was no great step to arrange devices in which a response _ "produced" food in a similar fashion. 1 ), one of Pavlov's associates, studied an experimental arrangement, close to Thorndike, in which a child squeezed a rubber bulb and delivered candy into his mouth. Miller and Konorski (1928) devised an apparatus in which a shock to the foot of a dog elicited flexion of the leg, and the resulting movement was followed by the presentation of food; the leg eventually flexed even when the foot was not shocked. In America D. K. Adams (1929) used a similar arrangement with cats, and in England Grindley (1932) with guinea pigs. The essential features may be seen in an apparatus in which depression of a lever operates a food dispenser (Skinner, 1932) . Pressing a lever is not a natural or unconditioned way of getting food. The response produces food only in the sense that food follows it-a Humean version of causality. Behavior is nevertheless altered. The consequences of action change the organism regardless of how or why they follow. The connection need not be functional or organic-as, indeed, it was not in Thorndike's experiment.
PRACTICAL ADVANTAGES
These early devices were not designed to eliminate spatial representations of purpose, but they all did so, and the fact had far-reaching consequences. Some of these were practical. The experimenter could choose a response which was conveniently recorded, or one which the organism could execute rapidly and without fatigue for long periods of time, or one which minimized the peculiarities of a species and thus furthered a comparison between species with respect to properties not primarily related to the topography of behavior. In particular, it was possible to choose a response which was relatively free of extraneous variables and not likely to be confused with responses elicited or evoked by them. When a shuttle box, for example, is used to study the effect of the postponement or termination of a shock, the behavior affected (running or jumping from one side to the other) is topographically similar to unconditioned responses to the shock, such as startle or jumping into the air, and to more elaborate patterns of escape from a space in which shocks have been received. It may also resemble response of both these sorts conditioned in the Pavlovian manner and elicited by the warning stimuli. The inevitable confusion can be avoided by making the postponement or termination of a shock contingent on an arbitrary response, such as pressing a lever in the Sidman arrangement, which is not otherwise related to the variables at issue (Sidman, 1953) .
A response which is only temporally related to its consequences could also be conveniently studied with automatic equipment. Instruments were developed which permitted the investigator to conduct many experiments simultaneously, particularly when unskilled technical help was available. It is true that automatic mazes and discrimination boxes had been or were soon to be built, but most modern programing and recording equipment can be traced to research on responses with arbitrarily arranged consequences for the very good reason that the conditions are easily instrumented. The availability of automatic equipment has helped to standardize experiments and has facilitated the study of relations between responses and consequences too complex to be arranged by hand or followed by eye.
Another practical result was terminological. The concept of the .reflex .made no reference to the consequences "of a response. Reflexes were often obviously "adaptive," but this was primarily a phylogenetic effect. The term "ppermit" was introduced to distinguish between reflexes and responses op-erating directly on the environment (Skinner, 1937) . The alternative term "instrumental" suggests the use of tools. To say that a rat "uses a lever to obtain food" has purposive overtones, and where nothing can be identified as an instrument, it is often said that the organism "uses a response" to gain an effect. For example, verbal behavior is interpreted as "the use of words," although the implication that words exist as things apart from behavior unnecessarily complicates an analysis (Skinner, 19S7) . Another change was from "reward" to "reinforcement." Reward suggests compensation for behaving in a given way, often in some sort of contractual arrangement. Reinforcement in. its, etymological_sejnse_..designalea.. simply (the strengthening of a response. It_refers_.tO-similar eyentsjnj^ay.liman-conditioningy-^where-r-eward is inappropriate. These changes in terminology ave not automatically eliminated purposive ex-(such as, "The pigeon was reinforced for pecking the key"), but a given instance can usually be rephrased. Comparable teleological expressions are common in other sciences, as Bernatowicz (1958) has pointed out.
OF RESPONDING AS A DATUM
A more important result of studying an arbitrary connection between a response and its consequences, together with the simplified procedures which then become available, has been to emphasize rate of responding as a property of behavior. Earlier devices were almost always used to study responses from trial to trial, where rate of responding was controlled by the experimenter and hence obscured as a datum. When the organism can respond at any time, its rate of responding varies in many subtle ways over a wide range. Changes in rate comprise a vast and previously largely unsuspected subject matter. (The changes are made conspicuous with a cumulative recorder, the ubiquity of which in the study of operant behavior is no accident. In a cumulative record, rate and changes in rate are visible at a glance over substantial periods of time. The "on-line" record permits the experimenter to note changes as they occur and take appropriate steps.)
Rate of responding is important because it is especially relevant to the principal task of a scientific analysis. Behavior is often interesting because of what might be called its character. Animals court their mates, build living quarters, care for their young, forage for food, defend territories, and so on, in many fascinating ways. These are worth studying, but the inherent drama can divert attention from another task. Even when reduced to general principles, a narrative account of how animals behave must be supplemented by a consideration of why. What is required is an analysis of the ronditicms~ which -governJtoejarpbability that a given response will occur at a., given time. Rate of , responding is by no means to be equated with/^Mx J * probability of responding, as frequency theories of probability and comparable problems in physics have shown. Many investigators prefer to treat rate of responding as a datum in its own right.' Eventually, however, the prediction and control of behavior call for an evaluation of the probability that a response will be emitted. The study of rate of responding is a step in that direction.
Rate of responding is one of those aspects of a subject matter which do not attract attention for their own sake and which undergo intensive study only when their usefulness as a dependent variable has been discovered. Other sciences have passed through comparable stages. The elements and compounds studied by the chemist also have fascinating characters-they exist in many colors, textures, and states of aggregation and undergo surprising transmutations when heated, dissolved, combined, and so on. These are the characteristics which naturally first attract attention. They were, for example, the principal concern of the alchemists. In contrast, the mere weight of a given quantity of a substance is of little interest in its own right. Yet it was only when the weights of substances entering into reactions were found to obey certain laws that chemistry moved into its modern phase. Combining weight became important because of what could be done with it. Rate of responding has emerged as a basic datum in a science of behavior for similar reasons-and, hopefully, with comparable results.
Rate of responding djffen5_|ro,in the measures derived from earlier devices and procedures, such as the time required to complete a task or the effort expended or the number of errors-made in doing so, and the two kinds of data have led to different conceptions of behavior as a scientific subject matter. We like to believe that basic processes are orderly, continuous, and significant, but the data obtained from mazes, memory drums, shuttle boxes, and so on, vary "noisily" from trial to trial and / 5
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depend for their dimensions on particular tasks and apparatuses. Orderly and significant processes are therefore sought elsewhere-in some mental, physiological, or merely conceptual inner system which by its nature is neither directly observed in, nor accurately represented on any given occasion by, the performance of an organism. There is no comparable inner system in an operant analysis. Changes in rate of responding are directly observed, they have dimensions appropriate to a .scientific formulation, and undex---skillful _experi-mental control they-show the uniformity expected of biological processes in general. Those accustomed to the older formulation have nevertheless ij; found them difficult to accept as an alternative subject for analysis.
BEHAVIORAL PROCESSES
One difficulty is that changes in rate do not closely resemble the behavioral processes inferred from earlier measures. A few examples may be cited from the field of learning. By arranging a reinforcing-consequence, we--increase the rate at which a response occurs; by eliminating the consequence, we decrease the rate. These are the processes of operant conditioning and extinction. Topographical properties of the response depend on the contingencies. The force with which a lever is pressed, for example, is related to the force required to operate the food dispenser. An initial moderate force can be increased indefinitely, within physiological limits, by progressively requiring greater forces. A complex topography can be "shaped" with a series of changing contingencies, called a program, each stage of which evokes a response and also prepares the organism to respond at a later stage. A shaping program can be mechanically prescribed in advance, but the process is most easily demonstrated when the experimenter improvises contingencies as he goes.
The behaviors evoked by mazes, puzzle boxes, memory drums, and so on, are also shaped, but almost always without specific programing of contingencies. The organism is usually exposed at once to a set of /emi«aL£Qntingencies, for which it possesses ho adequate behavior. Responses occur, however-the rat explores the maze, the subject guesses at the next nonsense syllable-and some of these may be reinforced in ways which lead at last to a terminal performance. What can we conclude from the series of stages through which this comes about?
Such data are usually plotted in so-called learning curves showing, let us say, the times required to complete a task or the number of errors made in doing so, by trials. These are facts and in some sense quantifiable. From such a curve we may predict within limits how another organism will behave in similar circumstances. But the shape of the curve tells us little or nothing about_tlie-^proc-esses of conditioning and extinction-revealed in an operant analysis. It merely describes the rather crude overall effects of adventitious contingencies, and it often tells us more about the apparatus-or procedure than about the organism. Ŝ imilar discrepancies appear in the analysis of stimuli. In so-called stimulus-response theories, a stimulus is broadly defined as something which customarily precedes a response-the eliciting stimulus in a conditioned reflex, the "cue" to more complex behavior, or even an internal "drive state." The term is little more than a synonym for cause, and various relations between cause and effect are usually not distinguished. The stimulus control of an operant, on the other hand, has been carefully analyzed. Although we can shape the topography of a response without identifying or manipulating any anterior stimulus, stimuli enter into a more complex type of contingency in which a response is reinforced in the presence of a stimulus and is therefore more likely to be emitted in its presence. The relations among the three terms in this contingency -stimulus, response, and reinforcement-comprise a substantial field for investigation.
One property of the control acquired by a stimulus when a response is reinforced in its presence is shown in the so-called stimulus generalization gradient. Hypothetical gradients in mental, neurological, or conceptual inner systems have been discussed for years, but thanks to the work of Guttman (1963) and his students, and others, behavioral gradients are now directly observed. A pigeon, reinforced when it pecks a circular key of a given color and size, will peck keys of other shapes, colors, or sizes at lower rates depending upon the differences in the properties. When the response is reinforced in the presence of one property and extinguished in the presence of others-the wellknown process of discrimination-a very sensitive and powerful control is established. In a class-
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room demonstration a response is brought under the control of a red as against a green key. So long as the key is green, no response is made; when it turns red, the pigeon pecks it immediately. The power of the stimulus can be dramatically shown by changing from red to green just as the pigeon's beak moves toward the key. The pecking response will be interrup.t£fUn_jni4-air, even though stopping probably requires more energy than following through. Stimulus control can also be shaped by changing relevant stimuli in a program which leads the organism into subtle discriminations, often without "errors," as Terrace (1963) has recently shown. Very little of this is seen in traditional studies of sensory learning, however. In using a classical multiple-choice apparatus, for example, the organism is exposed at once to a set of terminal contingencies. Its progress toward an appropriate performance is represented in a curve showing, say, the number of errors made or the times required to reach a criterion, over a series of trials, but the dimensions of these measures are again arbitrary, and the behavior is obviously the product of shifting. largely^_adverrtr-jMuj__CQntingencies.
,,Q Classical studies of Warning have emphasized the process of acquisition, presumably because one can easily see that an organism is doing something new or is responding to a new stimulus, but reinforcement is also responsible for the fact that an organism goes on responding long after its behavior has been acquired. The fact has usually been attributed to motivational variables, but an experimental analysis has shown that various schedules of intermittent reinforcement are usually involved. The nature or quantity of reinforcement is often much less important than the schedule on which it is received. Programing is again important, for many schedules can take effect only when the organism has passed through intervening contingencies. To take a very simple example-an apparatus which reinforces every hundredth response will have no effect at all if 100 responses are never emitted, but by reinforcing every second, then every fifth, then every tenth response, and so on, waiting until the behavior is well developed at each stage, we can bring the organism under the control of the more demanding schedule. The pathological gambler and the dedicated scientist both show terminal behavior resulting from a special history of reinforcement on a related ("variablejratio") schedule-a history which society attempts to prevent in the former case and encourage in the latter.
The history which brings a complex terminal schedule into control is not, of course, visible in the terminal performance. A scientist once borrowed an apparatus to demonstrate the use of a multiple fixed-interval fixed-ratio schedule in assessing the effects of certain drugs. When one of the pigeons lent with the apparatus was accidentally killed, he purchased another, put it into the apparatus, and was surprised to find that nothing happened^'^vTe make the same mistake when we attempt to explain conspicuous effects of reinforce-M ,7 f ment on human behavior by examining only current schedulesT^ 01 /', f Comptex terminal contingencies involving multiple stimuli and responses, in sequential or concurrent arrangements, are often called problems. An organism is said to have solved such a problem when it comes under the control of the terminal contingencies. Its capacity to respond appropriately under such contingencies must, however, be distinguished from its capacity to reach them through a given series of intervening stages. Whether an organism can solve a problem in this sense is-as_mucbL a qaesfcien-of-the-program through ^, . which it passes-and the skill of the programmer f . ', who constructed it-as_o.l any so-called problem '-,,-,,,, solving ability. Whether an organism "can solve a . probTemTwithout the help of a prepared program v ,^ , . , ,, depends on the behavior initially available and the y' /-< more or less accidental contingencies which follow/-;-' •» from it. Apparent differences in problem solving ability among species or among organisms of different ages or other properties within a species must be interpreted accordingly. Solving a problem, like learning, is again often attributed to an innec sysiem, although the supposed inner proc-,, esses, like the facts they explain, are more complex. Those committed to sequestered faculties and thought processes are not likely to feel at home in an analysis of the behavior itself and may, therefore, find it inacceptable as an alternative enterprise.
STATISTICS
Another difficulty is methodological. Processes taking place in some inner system can usually be ?/«>£•. investigated only with "statistics." If learning is never accurately represented in one performance, performances must be averaged. If statements about the inner system cannot be directly confirmed, hypotheses must be set up, and theorems deduced and tested, following established practices in logic and scientific method. If some properties of the inner system are meaningful only with respect to larger sets of facts, a procedure such as factor analysis may be needed. It is not surprising that research on this pattern has come to be judged by the sophistication of its statistical and logical techniques. Confidence in an experiment is proportional to the number of subjects studied, an experiment is good only if properly "designed," and results are significant only at a level determined by special tests.
Much of this is lacking in the experimental analysis of behavior, where experiments are usually performed on a few subjects, curves representing behavioral processes are seldom averaged, the behavior attributed to complex mental activity is analyzed directly, and so on. The simpler procedure is possible because rate of responding and changes in rate can be directLy_ja]jserved, especially when represented in cumulative records. The effect is similar to increasing the resolving power of a microscope: A new subject matter is suddenly open to direct inspection. Statistical methods are unnecessary. When an organism is showing a stable or slowly changing performance, it is for most purposes idle to stop to evaluate the confidence with which the next stage can be predicted. When a variable is changed and the effect on performance observed, it is for most purposes idle to prove statistically that a change has indeed occurred. (It is sometimes said in such a case that the organism is "used as its own control," but the expression, borrowed from a basically different methodology, is potentially troublesome.) Much can be done in the study of behavior with methods of observation no more sophisticated than those available to Faraday, say, with his magnets, wires, and cells. Eventually the investigator may move on to peripheral areas where indirect methods become necessary, but until then he must forego the prestige which attaches to traditional statistical methods.
Some traditional uses must also be questioned. Learning curves remain inadequate no matter how smooth they are made by averaging cases. Statistical techniques may eliminate noise, but the dimensions are still faulty. A curve which enables us to predict the performance of another organism does not therefore represent a basic process. Moreover, curves which report changes in variables having satisfactory dimensions can often not be averaged. The idiosyncracies in a cumulative record do not necessarily show caprice on the part of the organism or faulty technique on the part of the experimenter. The complex system we call an organism has an elaborate and largely unknown history which endows it with a certain individuality. No two organisms embark upon an experiment in precisely the same condition nor are they affected in the same way by the contingencies in an experimental space. (Most contingencies would not be representative if they were precisely controlled, and in any case are effective only in combination with the behavior which the organism brings to the experiment.) Statistical techniques cannot eliminate this kind of individuality; they can only obscure and falsify it. An averaged curve seldom correctly represents any of the cases contributing to it (Sidman, 1960 ).
An analysis which recognizes the individuality of the organism is particularly valuable when contact is made with other disciplines such as neurology, psychopharmacology, and psychotherapy, where idiosyncratic sets of variables must also be considered. The rigor of the analysis is not necessarily threatened. Operant methods make their own use of Grand Numbers: Instead of studying l.,Q_QQ--rats""for 1 hour each,._or.,,lQ_Q, rats for 10 hours each, the investigator is likely to Siydy 1 rat for LOJXLJipurs. The procedure is not only appropriateto an enterprise which recognizes individuality, it is at least equally efficient in its use of equipment and of the investigator's time and energy. The ultimate test of uniformity or reproducibility is not to be found in method but in the degree of control achieved, a test which the experimental analysis of behavior usually passes easily.
The study of operant behavior also seldom follows the "design of experiments" prescribed by statisticians. A prior design in which variables are distributed, for example, in a Latin square may be a severe handicap. When effects on behavior can be immediately observed, it is most efficient to explore relevant variables by manipulating them in an improvised and rapidly changing design. Similar ~f /f tJ^> A nonstatistical strategy may also be recommended for its effect on the behavior of the investigator, who is perhaps as strongly reinforced during a successful experiment as the organism he studies. The contingencies to which he is submitted largely determine whether he will continue in similar work. Statistical techniques often inject a destructive delay betweeiLlhe_cc>Bdirct of an experiniejiL_and the discovery of_the^-sigatficance' of the data-a fatal violation of a fundamental principle of reinforcement. The exceptional zeal which has often been noted in students of operant behavior is possibly attributable to the immediacy of their results.
THE CIRCUMVENTION OF AN OPERANT ANALYSIS
By accepting changes in rate of responding as basic behavioral processes and by emphasizing environmental variables which can be manipulated with the help of automatic equipment, research on operant behavior has been greatly simplified. But it has not been made easy. Technical advances have been offset by the demand for incrjasjngjigor, by the probkrns_jvhjcJb~aJise î snHatJLiime, an( j by the attack on more and more complex^rrangement5_qf interrelatedjjperants. Behavior -human or otherwise -remains an extremely diffiajlt__subjficL-Bifttter. It is not surprising that practices which seem to circumvent or simplify an operant analysis are common. In particular, vertial between subject and experimenter V A r J is widely used in lieu of the explicit arrangement of contingencies of reinforcement and the objective recording of behavior. The practice goes back to the study of mental life and is still favored by psychologists who formulate their subject matter in mental terms, but it survives as if it were a_labor^ ^ U ,'\ saviag-deviee in many essentially behavioristic for-, <--mulations.
The manipulation of independent variables appears to be circumvented when, instead of exposing an organism to a set of contingencies, the contingencies are simply described in "instructions." Instead of shaping a response, the subject is told to respond in a given way. A history of reinforcement or punishment is replaced by a promise or threat: "Movement of the lever will sometimes operate a coin dispenser" or ". . . deliver a shock to your leg." A schedule of positive or negative reinforcement is described rather than imposed: "Every response to the right lever postpones the shock but increases the number of responses to the left lever required to operate the coin dispenser." Instead of bringing the behavior under the control of a stimulus, the subject is told to behave as if a discrimination had been established: "Start when the light goes on, stop when it goes off." Thus instructed, the subject is asked either to behave appropriately or to describe behavior he might emit under such circumstances. The scope of the verbal substitute can be estimated by considering how a nonverbal organism, human or otherwise, could be similarly "instructed."
Descriptions of contingencies are, of course, often effective. Hypothetical consequences are commonly used for practical purposes ("Will you do the job if I pay^you $50?" or "How would you feel about going if I told you that X would be there?"), and
the subject is worth studying. Verbal instruction may be defended when the resulting behavior is not the primary object of interest; for example, the experimenter may show a subject how to operate a piece of equipment rather than shape his behavior through reinforcement so long as he is not concerned with the acquisition of the response but with what happens to it later. ^Verbal communication is not, however, a substitute, for the arrangement and manipulation of variable^! ' T here is no reason why a description of contingencies of reinforcement should have the same effect as exposure to the contingencies. A subject can seldom accurately describejthe way in which he has_a^±uallyJlBE£iE^iffT5rced. Even when he has been trained to identify a few simple contingencies, f;'' 'hej^nnot-ihen. describe a ne,w__c.Qn,tinge,ncy, particularly when it is complex. We can scarcely expect him, therefore, to react appropriately to descriptions by the experimenter. Moreover, the verbal contingencies between subject and experimenter must be taken into account. Instructions must in some way promise___or ^threaten xortsequejices not _ ^erniane-tQjhe-«5Epmincnt if the subject is to follow them. The other major task in an operant analysis may seem to be circumvented when, instead of recording behavior so that rate or probability of response can be observed or inferred, the experimenter simply asks the subject to evaluate his tendency to respond or to express his preference for responding in one way rather than another. The subject may ....do so by describ,ing^is_"intenJ;i0ns' J --er__i t .plans^.,pr by reporting "expectations" regarding the consequences of an action. Such behavior may be worth f, ^ investigating, but it is not a substitute for the behavior observed in an operant analysis. Only in the simplest cases can a person correctly describe his ongoing behavior. The difficulty is not linguistic, for he may be given an operandum and permitted to "model" the behavior-for example, to generate a cumulative record. It is practically impossible to construct a curve closely resembling the curve one would generate if actually exposed to a specified set of contingencies, or even a curve one has already generated when so exposed. Changes in rate of responding are.'not easy to__dfiscribe. They necessarily take place m time, and even a ' ' second observer cannot "see" them until they have been reduced to graphic form. The subject's own behavior presents other difficulties, which are not overcome by permitting him to be less specific. If we ask him to say simply whether he will be more or less likely to respond or will respond more or less rapidly, we have increased his chances of being right only by asking him to say less. Any report, no matter how specific, is also subject to the verbal contingencies which induce him to describe his behavior and possibly by similar contingencies elsewhere which may classify his behavior, for example, as right or wrong.
Verbal substitutes for arranged or observed variables may be used at different points in an investigation: Contingencies may be described and the subject's behavior then actually observed, the subject may be exposed to a set of contingencies and then asked to evaluate the nature or probability of his responses, and so on. Similar practices are used to evaluate the reinforcing or aversive properties of a given event or procedure, to predict the outcome of several variables operating at once, and so on, and are subject to the same criticism.
To those interested primarily in mental processes, verbal communication may not be an attempted circumvention or shortcut. -jQnjth_e contrary, an operant analy_sjs_jria ; y_ seem to be the long jway aromid. The position is sometimes defended by insisting that the student of behavior always begins with an interest in mental life-possibly his ownand designs his experiments essentially to test hypotheses about it. Whatever the case may once have been, operant research has long since passed the point at which the experimenter can be guided by considering possible effects of variables on himself. The introspective vocabulary used in circumventing an experimental analysis is hopelessly inadequate for the kinds of facts currently under investigation. If one field is to borrow from the other, the debt will henceforth almost certainly be in the other dixectipn: From the study of the be-J»' [ n <*• RaVioT'oTother organisms, the experimenter is most likely to come to understand himself. In some theories of knowledge, introspective observations may be regarded as primary data, but in an analysis of behavior they are a form of theorizing which is not required or necessarily helpful (Skinner, 1963) .
/A FORMAL ANALYSES OF CONTINGENCIES OF REINFORCEMENT
The consequences of action and their effects on behavior also enter into theories of probability, decision making, conflict, and games. The classical urn containing a given proportion of black and white balls may, like other sample spaces, be analyzed without reference to behavior, but it would be of little interest if the consequences of drawing either a black or white ball were not in some way reinforcing. (There has always been a close connection between probability theory and jambling, where every play is punishecTlo the'extent of its cost and some plays are also reinforced.) Probability theory also often takes into account the fact that this reinforcement will occur on an intermittent schedule, and that as a consequence the drawer will experience a given subjective or felt probability, or exhibit a given probability of drawing again.
The probability that the drawer will draw again is usually assumed to be related to the probability function of the sample space. A relation is implied when it is said that a subject who has sufficient knowledge about a given system, possibly inferred from his experience with it, can behave "rationally." A relation is also implied when it is argued that irrational behavior requires explanation. For example, the fact that intermittenl_re-inforcement raises the probability of responding abdve the value generated when all responses are reinforced has recently occasioned surprise (Lawrence & Festinger, 1962) , Any such relation is, of course, an empirical fact, to be determined experimentally. Standard operant equipment can be used to set up contingencies of reinforcement which have the effect of classical sample spaces. A schedule could, if necessary, be programed by actually drawing balls from an urn. An organism can then be exposed to the schedule and the effect on its behavior observed. In such a procedure the status of the probability function of the sample space (the schedule of reinforcement arranged by the programing equipment) is clear. The probability that the organism will respond at a given time is inferred from its rate.
The relation between the two probabilities is complicated by the fact that rate of responding under a given schedule depends, as we have seen, on previous exposure to the schedule. When introduced into an experimenfar"spacT for the first time, an organism may be said to show a certain "prior probability" of responding-the so-called operaTrt level. A first response is or is not reinforced, and the rate rises or falls accordingly. This brief history contributes to what is now a different situation. When the organism responds again and is again possibly reinforced, the situation changes still more substantially. A given set of contingencies yields a performance which combines with the programing equipment to generate other contingencies which in turn generate other performances, and so on.
Many of these interactions between behavior and programing equipment have been carefully studied. Under a variable-interval schedule of reinforcement, for example, the organism often responds at a nearly constant rate for long periods of time. All reinforcements therefore occur when it is responding at that rate, although this_cpndition_is not specified by the equipment. The rate becomes a discriminative and, in turn, a reinforcing stimulus, which opposes any change to a different rate-such as would otherwise be induced by, say, a psychopharmacological agent. As another example, when only the first response after the passage of a fixed interval of time is reinforced, the organism comes to exhibit a fairly stable performance in which the number of responses emitted during an interval approaches constancy. The organism is then being reinforced not only after a constant interval of time but after emitting a. constant number.-of-responses. The latter condition, which is 'not specified by the equipment, is characteristic of a fixed-ratio schedule, and it generates a much higher rate of responding. As rapid responding breaks through, the stability of the fixed-interval performance is destroyed, the number of responses per reinforcement is no longer constant and a stable interval performance is restored, as another cycle begins (Ferster & Skinner, 19S7) .
A third example is closer to probability theory. A schedule in which a response is reinforced upon completion of an appreciable fixed or variable number of responses must often be reached through a program, as we have seen. The number must first be small, but the schedule favors reinforcement when the organism is responding at a high rate, and it is soon possible to/-stretch" the requirjj.rrj.ent. When a hungry rat is reinforced with food for running in a wheel, the required distance can be in-creased until more energy is consumed than is available in the food received (Skinner, 1938) . The behavior of the gambler, which almost always shows a similar "negative utility," is the result of the same kind of stretchingr The variable-ratio schedules inherent in gambling systems maintain behavior only after a history of reinforcement in which behavior has combined with the programing equipment to generate certain powerful terminal contingencies.
In summary, a scheduling system has no effect until an organism is exposed to it, and it then no longer fully determines the contingencies. Still other interactions between equipment and performance arise when a second response is introduced in order to study choice or decision making. Suppose, for example, that a subject may press either of two keys, A and B, on which reinforcements are independently scheduled. The performance on either key can be accounted for only by examining the combined action of equipment and earlier performances on both keys. For example, if reinforcements are programed on interval schedules, responding to A after B is more likely to be reinforced than responding to B after B since the equipment may have set up a reinforcement on A while a response was being made to B. The behavior of changing from A to B or from B to A may be favored to the point at which the performance becomes a simple alternation (Skinner, 1950) . This yields the same rate on both keys, even though the schedules may be substantially different. The interaction may be corrected with a "change-over delay" in which, for example, a response to B is not reinforced if a response to A has been made during the preceding second, or in which the first response to either key after changing over is never reinforced (Herrnstein, 1961) . The contingencies on the two levers are nevertheless still subject to other interactions. (A word of caution: By manipulating the change-over delay and other characteristics of the schedules it may be possible to generate rates of responding on the two keys which would be predicted from ^me_ hypothesis of rationality or util-._. r ity. It is tempting to regard these as optimal conditions and possibly to stop the research when they have been discovered.)
Interactions between performance and programing system are still more complex if the performance changes the system, as in the so-called "adjusting" and "interlocking" schedules (Ferster & Skinner, 19S7) . Many examples are to be found in the theory of games and conflict, where the behavior of onejorganism alters the contingencies affecting 'another, and vice versa. The rules of any game can be represented by programing equipment which is subject to modification by the performances of the players, but the actual contingencies of reinforcement are still more complex, for they include conditions not specified by the equipment but generated by the earlier performances of all parties.
(That there is a limitation inherent in formal analyses is suggested by the fact that mathematical inquiries into probability, decision making, conflict, and games confine themselves almost exclusively to ratio schedules. The contingencies defined in sample spaces and rules practically always specify reinforcement as a function of a number of responses, a restraint traceable perhaps to practical issues involving winning, losing, and ultimate utility. Yet the interactions between equipment and performance are the same when reinforcement is scheduled by clocks or speedometers rather than by counters, and the same processes are involved, as an experimental analysis has abundantly shown.)
The formal properties of sample spaces, like the various conditions under which choices are made, games played, or conflicts resolved, may be analyzed without taking behavior into account or, at most, by assuming selected performances. Those interested primarily in a formal analysis are likely to approach behavior, if at all, by setting up hypotheses. The research which follows has the nature of hypothesis testing and is wasteful if the data collected lose their value when a hypothesis has been disproved or abandoned for other reasons. An experimental analysis of the behavior generated by the contingencies in sample spaces may be conducted without guessing at the results. ^-•
THE USE OF FORMAL ANALYSES
Formal analyses of contingencies of reinforcement are related to behavior in another way when they are used as guides. The behavior of a person who has calculated his chances, compared alterna-; , tives, or considered the consequences of a move is different from, and usually more effective than, the behavior of one who has merely been exposed to the unanalyzed contingencies. The formal analysis functions as a discriminative stimulus. When such a stimulus is perfectly correlated with reinforce-ment, the behavior under its control is maximally reinforced. On an interval schedule and in the absence of related stimuli, an organism emits unreinforced or "wasted" responses, but if the apparatus presents a conspicuous stimulus whenever a reinforcement becomes available, the organism eventually responds only in the presence of that stimulus and no responses are wasted. Clocks provide stimuli of this sort in connection with events occurring on interval schedules and are built and used for just that reason. Stimuli less closely correlated with reinforcement yield lesser improvements in efficiency. If a given setting on a clock cannot be_ sharply-discriminated, for example, some responses will be emitted prior to "the time to respond" and some potentially effective responses may be delayed, but performance is nevertheless improved. A speedometer serves a similar function when reinforcement depends on a given rate of responding.
Formal analyses of sample spaces serve the same function as imprecise clocks and speedometers. Not every response under their control is reinforced, but there is still a net gain. When a man learns to play poker under the contingencies arranged by the cards and rules, his sampling of the possible contingencies is necessarily limited, even in prolonged play. He will play a more successful game, and after a much shorter history, if he consults a table showing his chances of success in making given plays. The contingencies in poker also depend upon the behavior of other players, and prior stimuli correlated with that behavior are therefore also useful. They are particularly important in such a game as chess.._Chess playing may be shaped by the unanalyzed contingencies generated by the rules of the game and by the performances of opponents, but a player will play a better game, after a shorter history, if he can consult standard gambits, defenses, end games, and so on, which show some of the likely consequences of given moves.
A stimulus commonly correlated with reinforcement and hence useful in improving efficiency is the record left by previous behavior. When a man finds his way from one place to another, he may leave traces which prove useful when he goes that way again. He wears a path which supplements the change taking place in his behavior and may even be useful to others who have not gone that way before. A path need not be constructed because it serves this function, but the advantages gained may reinforce the explicit leaving of traces. A trail is "blazed," for example, precisely because it is more easily followed. Comparable reinforcing advantages have led men to construct pictures and verbal descriptions of paths.
Many proverbs and maxims are crude descriptions of contingencies of social or nonsocial reinforcement, and those who observe them come under a more effective control of their environment. Rules of grammar and spelling bring certain verbal contingencies of reinforcement more forcefully into play. Society codifies its ethical, legal, and religious practices so that by following a code the individual may emit behavior appropriate to social contingencies without having been directly exposed to them. Scientific laws serve a similar function in guiding the behavior of scientists.
A person could, of course, construct rules of grammar and spelling, maxims for effective personal conduct, tables of probabilities in the games he plays, and scientific laws for his own use, but society usually analyzes the predictable contingencies for him. He constructs comparable stimuli for himself when he makes resolutions, announces intentions, states expectations, and formulates plans. The stimuli thus generated control his behavior most effectively when they are external, conspicuous, and durable-when the resolution is posted or the plan actually drafted in visible form -but they are also useful when created upon occasion, as by recalling the resolution or reviewing the plan. The gain from any such discriminative stimulus depends upon the extent to which it correctly represents the contingencies which led to its construction.
Discriminative stimuli which improve the efficiency of behavior under given contingencies of reinforcement are important, but they must not be confused with the contingencies themselves, nor their effects with the effects of those contingencies. The behavior of the poker player who evaluates his chances before making a given play merely resembles that of the player whose behavior has been shaped by prolonged exposure to the game. The behavior of one who speaks correctly by applying the rules of a grammar merely resembles the behavior of one who speaks correctly from long experience in a verbal community. The efficiency may be the same, but_the controlling variables are different and the b~ehaviors are therefore different.
Nothing which could be called following a plan or applying a rule is observed when behavior is a product of the contingencies alone. To say that "the child who learns a language has in some sense constructed the grammar for himself" (Chomsky, 1959) is as misleading as to say that a dog which has learned to catch a ball has in some sense constructed the relevant part of the science of mechanics. Rules can be extracted from the reinforcing contingencies in both cases, and once in existence they may be used as guides. The direct effect of the contingencies is of a different nature.
The distinction bears on two points already made. In the first place, the instructions used in circumventing an operant analysis also have the status of prior stimuli associated with hypothetical or real contingencies of reinforcement, but behavior in response to them is not^the_behavior_generaled by exposure to the contingencies-themselves even when, on rare "occasions, the two are similar. When subjects report that they understand instructions and hence know what to expect, it does not follow that comparable reportable states are generated by the contingencies themselves. In the second place-to return at last to the point with which this paper began-when a man explicitly states his purpose in acting in a given way he may, indeed, be constructing a "contemporary surrogate of future consequences" which will affect subsequent behavior, possibly in useful ways. It does not follow, however, that the._b.ghavior generated by the consequences alone, js-under the-control of any comparable pjrior_stirnulus, such as a felt purpose or intention.
THE CONTINGENCIES OF REINFORCEMENT
The Law of Effect specifies a simple temporal order of response and consequence-the relation implied by the term operant. The contingencies of reinforcement currently under investigation are much more complex. Reinforcement may be contingent, not only on the occurrence of a response, but on special features of its topography, on the presence of prior stimuli, and on scheduling systems. An adequate analysis must also reach into the traditional fields of motivation and emotion to determine what is reinforcing and under what conditions. Interrelated systems of operants raise other problems.
The techniques of an experimental analysis have fortunately remained commensurate with the increasing complexity of the subject. Rate of responding has come to be examined over a much wider range and in much greater detail. Cumulative records have been supplemented by distributions of interresponse times and, very recently, by "on-line" computer processing. Better measures of topographical properties have become available. Independent variables have been effectively controlled over a wider range and in more complex patterns. Arrangements of operants resembling many of the behaviors attributed to higher mental processes have been successfully constructed and studied.
The experimental space has been improved. Brief daily experimental periods have given way to continuous observation for many hours, days, weeks, or even months. More of the behavior exhibited in the experimental space has been controlled, recorded, and analyzed. Total control of the environment from birth is within range. As in the study of animal behavior in general, the hundreds of thousands of extant species arc still far from adequately sampled, but problems of instrumentation have been solved for a fairly wide range of anatomical and behavioral differences.
The contingencies of reinforcement which define operant behavior are important in the analysis of variables of other sorts. The stimulus control of behavior is central to a kind of nonverbal psychophysics, where interest may be primarily in the action of receptor mechanisms. Operant techniques arc important in defining the behavioral effects of physiological variables-surgical, electrical, and chemical-in specifying what aspects of behavior are to be attributed to hereditary endowment, in tracing features of mature behavior to early environment, and so on. They are important in clarifying the nature of defective, retarded, or psychotic behavior. As Lindsley (1963) has pointed out, the important thing about a psychotic is often not what he is doing but whatjie is not doing, and in such a case it is important to be able to predict normal performances under standard conditions.
Contingencies of reinforcement are also valuable in interpreting behavior not easily submitted to a laboratory analysis. Verbal behavior, for example, can be defined just in terms of its contingencies: Its special characteristics are derived from the fact that reinforcement is mediated by other organisms. In education the.-instructional programing of reinforcement is the raison d'etre of teaching ma-chines, the future of which is much brighter than current activities may suggest. It is too early to predict the effect of comparable analyses in other branches of the social sciences-for example, economics and government-but if the history of physical technology is any guide, the knowledge and skills derived from an experimental analysis will become increasingly important.
In short, in the field of human behavior as a whole, the contingencies of reinforcement which define operant behavior are widespread if not ubiquitous. Those who are sensitive to this fact are sometimes embarrassed by the frequency with which they see reinforcement everywhere, as Marxists see class struggle or Freudians the Oedipus relation. Yet the fact is that reinforcement is extraordinarily important. That is why it is reassuring to recall that its place was once takenJryjhe concept of jnirpose; no one is likely jp_object to a_search_for purpose in every_Juiirian act. The difference is that we -ape^nCwTn a position to search effectively. In its very brief history, the study of operant behavior has clarified the nature of the relation between behavior and its consequences and has devised techniques which apply the methods of a natural science to its investigation.
